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Given the continuing decline of Christianity in the West and the growing indifference 
to theology within both the academy and Western culture, it is not surprising that Western 
Christians and theologians should respond with enthusiasm to any secular thinker who 
engages with the Christian tradition. This is certainly the case with Slavoj Žižek, whose 
popularity amongst Christians has grown as Christianity becomes ever more central to his 
philosophical project. But given the long history of Christianity’s entanglement with 
colonialism, anti-Semitism and white supremacy there are reasons to be concerned about this 
focus on Christianity as a resource for radical thinking. This is especially true in our current 
context, in which the appeal to ‘Christian Europe’ has become increasingly important both to 
explicitly racist far-right organisations within Europe and to the dogwhistle racism of 
mainstream politics. 
It is certainly the case that Žižek’s advocacy of Christianity as crucial for radical 
politics is bound up with his argument that the best hope for the contemporary left is a 
recovery of the ‘European legacy’. It is also true that Žižek’s work – in which human history 
reaches its highest point in the atheism which emerges out of Christianity, which in turn 
surpasses first paganism, and then the ‘world religions’ –  fits comfortably into the white 
supremacist narrative whereby ‘the secular West rejects religion for itself … as the price that 
must be paid in order to reject the non-West by characterising this non-West as religious’ 
(Barber, 2011:110). In addition, Žižek has a tendency to repeat classically racist and anti-
Semitic tropes: that the veil worn by Muslim women reflects a greater proclivity towards 
sexual violence amongst Muslim men (2009b: 107);
1
 that Christianity represents the 
                                                          
1 
 For more detailed discussion of the racist and colonialist history of this argument, see e.g. Delphy, 
Separate 2015. Delphy argues that the assertion that Muslim culture is uniquely prone to sexual violence 
‘allows France to kill two birds with one stone: not only can it use it to condemn the “others”, above all it can 
absolve itself of the sin now being “exposed”’. The example Žižek cites as support for his claim that, unlike 
‘Muslim countries’, ‘the West relies on the premise that men are capable of sexual restraint’ is an Australian 
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‘overcoming’ of the Jewish Law by love.2 But, as Žižek responds to one critic who attacks his 
celebration of Christianity, he does not consider these parallels between his own work and the 
logics of white supremacy, anti-Semitism and colonialism to constitute a sufficient challenge 
to his ideas, because at the heart of his argument is the claim that the limitations of 
Eurocentric thought can be overcome only from within (2002, 580).  
 
In this article, I will explore the fundamental logic which drives Žižek’s claim that the 
‘European-Christian legacy’ is not simply the best but the only source for the notions of 
universality he considers essential for radical politics today. I will argue that this claim is not 
only a problem because of the ways in which it justifies the ongoing violence of the Christian 
West, but because it is fundamentally inconsistent with Žižek’s underlying ontology. I will 
suggest that if Christians are to make use of Žižek’s work, we would do better to focus on 
this ontology - which offers valuable resources for re-imagining the Christian tradition - 
rather than Žižek’s celebration of the European-Christian legacy, which, whatever he claims, 
cannot maintain its Euro- and Christocentrism if it is to overcome its attachment to the white 
supremacist, anti-Semitic and imperialist legacy of European Christendom. 
 
Žižek and the European-Christian Legacy 
For Žižek, the key to radical politics is a concept of universality which emerges first 
and only in European and Christian history. However, the European and Christian legacies 
are not as synonymous as Žižek suggests, as is clear from his reliance on two different 
thinkers for this argument: Alain Badiou, who locates the origin of political universality in St 
Paul; and Jacques Rancière, who finds it first in Ancient Greece. This double appeal to both 
Europe and Christianity begins to unsettle Žižek’s claim that only the Christian-European 
legacy can offer hope for the future of radical politics. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Muslim cleric who excused a gang rape on the grounds that ‘If you take uncovered meat and place it outside on 
the street … and the cats come and eat it … The uncovered meat is the problem.’ Žižek is apparently unaware 
not only of the questionability of making claims about ‘Muslim countries’ on the basis of assertions made by 
Australian Muslims, but also of the grim frequency with which this precise logic is expressed by white 
Westerners. 
2 For a fuller account of the relationship between supersessionism and both racism and anti-Semitism, 
see Jennings, 2010. Žižek acknowledges the danger of ‘potentially anti-Semitic’ Christian supersessionism. In 
response, he argues that it is not that Christianity ‘“accomplished/fulfilled the Jewish Law … by supplementing 
it with the dimension of love, but by fully realizing the Law itself’ (Milbank and Žižek, 2009: 268, 270). It is 
not clear how this distinction absolves him . 
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Christian Universality 
For Žižek, the only truly radical political position is atheism; but to be an atheist one 
must first pass through Christianity. Žižek is a materialist: for him there is nothing outside of 
the material world, no transcendent principle or God to guide history. But he is not a crude 
materialist who believes that everything that exists can be reduced down to series of causes 
and effects so that, for example, human consciousness is nothing more than the movement of 
atoms within the brain. Instead, he is what Adrian Johnston calls a ‘transcendental 
materialist’, a materialist who thinks that that there is always a gap, an inherent excess in the 
physical processes of cause and effect such that something more than mere physical 
processes is able to emerge (2008). This means that human consciousness is more than 
merely the movement of atoms in the brain; and that human society is more than simply the 
sum of individual actions and intentions. While abstractions like money only exist because 
enough people believe in them, once individual beliefs have brought them into being they 
exert a power of their own, shaping individuals as well as being shaped by them.  
For Žižek, then, it is crucial to reckon with the incompleteness at the heart of all 
beings. The least sophisticated accounts of reality are those which seek to escape this internal 
antagonism: the least interesting religions are those which seek harmony. For Žižek this 
means both ‘paganism’ and ‘New Age spiritualities’. Žižek claims that ‘pagan’ religions (by 
which he means all religious and spiritual traditions which pre-date capitalism and cannot be 
classed amongst the major ‘world religions’) appeal to ‘cosmic Justice and Balance’, 
affirming a belief in ‘the circular death and rebirth of the Divinity’, such that no real 
historical change ever occurs (2000a: 118). ‘Paganism’ also affirms a belief in the ‘Great 
Chain of Being’, seeing hierarchy as a fundamental feature of both cosmos and society, and 
so it rejects any radical politics which seeks to fundamentally transform the social order 
(2011: 53).
3
 
Likewise, for Žižek,‘New Age’ spiritualities (which post-date capitalism) seek after 
wholeness. They hold that all religions appeal to ‘the same core of mystical experience’ 
affirming the possibility of entering into harmony with the universe (Milbank and Žižek, 
2009: 27); and they understand spirituality as a continuous process of growth, rejecting the 
possibility of radical change (2000b, 231).  
                                                          
3 
  This is an odd claim given that it is Christianity which transmitted the Greek notion of the Great Chain 
of Being through European history. 
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For Žižek, the monotheistic religions represent progress from either ‘paganism’ or 
‘New Age spiritualities’ because they emphasise transcendence: they know that the world is 
not harmonious but fundamentally ruptured. But where all monotheistic religions affirm the 
Oneness of God, Žižek argues, only Christianity recognises (in the doctrine of the Trinity) 
that there is no Oneness without rupture, no self-identity without difference (Milbank and 
Žižek, 2009: 86). And - perhaps more importantly - only Christianity opens the way to the 
recognition that transcendence is not outside the world but within it. Transcendence is not a 
being outside the world like the God of classical monotheism, but ‘that which is in us more 
than ourselves’. What dies on the cross, Žižek says, is ‘the God of Beyond himself, i.e. the 
notion of God qua inaccessible, transcendent, nonrevealed entity’ (2008a: 167). For Žižek, 
the resurrection is the arrival of the Holy Spirit which is ‘the community of believers’. The 
Spirit is nothing but the effect of this community and yet, nonetheless, is more than the sum 
of its parts (2001, 91). For Žižek, then, ‘Christianity (at its core, if disavowed by its 
institutional practice)’ is ‘the only truly consistent atheism’, and ‘atheists are the only true 
believers’ (2012: 118). This atheism is important not only because it is true but also because 
it alone enables the love which is at the heart of radical politics, and which, like Christ, 
‘brings peace, love, etc. and … a sword, turning son against father’ (2012: 107). ‘In true 
love’, Žižek says, ‘I “hate the beloved out of love”: I “hate” the dimension of his inscription 
into the socio-symbolic structure on behalf of my very love for him as a unique person’ 
(2000a: 126). This, for Žižek, is the core of radical politics. 
 
European Universality 
Žižek repeatedly appeals to ‘the European legacy’ as the hope for radical politics 
(2002: 579; see also 1998a and 1998b). Often this appeal to Europe is made simultaneously 
with an appeal to Christianity (2009b: 137, 139).
4
 Yet while Žižek’s appeal to Christianity 
relies heavily on the work of Alain Badiou, who sees St Paul’s understanding of Christianity 
as exemplary of ‘the Event’, a moment of radical break with the existing order of things, his 
appeal to Europe tends more often to rely on the work of Jacques Rancière, and his notion of 
‘politics proper’. ‘Politics proper’ emerges for the first time, according to Rancière, in 
Ancient Greece, and consists essentially of the those excluded from both recognition and 
                                                          
4  Here Žižek also refers to atheism as ‘a European legacy worth fighting for’, in a clear parallel 
with the title of his book The Fragile Absolute: Or, Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For? 
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power in society demanding their inclusion. As with Christian love, politics proper insists on 
emphasising that which is in the social order more than itself, the inconsistency, excess or 
antagonism which is not the obstacle to the harmony of the social order but the condition of 
its possibility. Žižek links this notion of politics proper to both Badiou and to Christianity: 
the logic of Rancière’s work ‘is, like Badiou’s thought, profoundly Christological’, the 
excluded part of the social order representing ‘the dimension of universality’ in the same way 
that Christ, the singular individual, stands for humanity in Christian theology and in Badiou’s 
understanding of Christianity (2000b: 228). 
But there is a problem here. The idea of a direct historical connection between ancient 
Greek thought — specifically ancient Greek notions of democracy — and early Christian 
thought — specifically Pauline notions of Christian identity — might fit comfortably into 
European and Christian self-mythologising. But to argue that both share a single history is to 
ignore the facts, not least the crucial role of both Judaism and Islam in forming and 
transmitting these ideas. Is the European legacy Greek, or Christian, or both? If ultimately a 
Greek legacy, what are we to make of Žižek’s repeated appeal to the Christianity of St Paul, 
which emerges separately from the democratic logic of classical Greek thought? If ultimately 
a Christian legacy, why appeal to Ancient Greece? And if it is both - if it is not only in 
Christianity or only in Ancient Greece that this logic emerges - this opens up the possibility 
that the same emphasis on antagonism and particularity which makes radical politics possible 
might emerge elsewhere, outside of Europe and/or outside of Christianity.  
I want to turn next to this possibility, and to argue that when Žižek says that the 
possibility for radical politics emerges only from Europe and/or only from Christianity, he not 
only plays into the narratives of white supremacy which prevail in the West (as previously 
discussed, this possibility does not especially concern Žižek); it is a failure on Žižek’s part to 
consistently maintain the fundamental concepts which drive his work.  
 
The problem with oneness 
 
Žižek’s ontology 
From the beginning, at the heart of Žižek’s work is the attempt to bring together the 
psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan with the philosophy of G W F Hegel and the political 
thought of Karl Marx. One crucial aspect of Žižek’s early work is the claim that human 
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society is structured in a way that parallels the structure of the individual subject: as an 
internally inconsistent being that seeks to deal with its incompleteness by projecting the cause 
of this incompleteness outwards, blaming its failure on an external impediment. So where the 
individual subject blames her dissatisfaction on her failure to find the right sexual partner, 
rather than her own inability to confront the truth of her desire, the social order looks for 
scapegoats to avoid facing up to its own internal antagonism: class struggle. In the mid-90s, 
Žižek extends this structural parallelism to the nature of the material world as such, so that 
just as society is riven by the antagonism of class struggle and the individual by the 
antagonism of desire, the material world itself is riven by the antagonism of quantum 
uncertainty.  
Žižek understands reality, then, as consisting of a series of levels: the material world, 
the individual subject, and the social order. Each level is constituted as an internally 
inconsistent, antagonistic One. These inconsistencies mean that each level is fundamentally 
historical, changing over time as a result of the struggle to reconcile its internal conflict. At 
both the individual and social levels it becomes possible for these inconsistent Ones to evade 
confrontation with their own consistency by inventing false narratives about the causes of 
their conflict and dissatisfaction: fantasy or ideology. So, for example, Žižek argues that 
‘Although politics proper is … something specifically “European”, the entire history of 
European political thought is ultimately nothing but a series of disavowals of the political 
moment, the proper logic of political antagonism’ (1998a: 991). Similarly, ‘the entire history 
of Christianity … is structured as a series of defenses against [its] traumatic apocalyptic core 
of incarnation/death/resurrection’ (Milbank and Žižek, 2009: 260).5 
 
Žižek’s internal antagonisms 
If every product of human subjectivity and society is internally divided, with a strong 
tendency to refuse to confront its own internal inconsistencies, this is no less true of Žižek’s 
work. There are three key inconsistencies in Žižek’s argument that only the Christian and/or 
European legacies can provide us with the resources for a truly radical politics: 
First, Žižek argues that every system is structured around a central antagonism; yet 
simultaneously maintains that only Europe and Christianity are able to provide the resources 
                                                          
5  Elsewhere, however, Žižek dismisses attempts to argue that Islam is a fundamentally peaceful religion, 
misused by fundamentalists to justify violence because ‘the game of redeeming the inner truth of a religion or 
ideology and separating this out from its later or secondary political exploitation is simply false’ (2009b, 116). 
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for recognising this antagonism. Central to Žižek’s ontology is the claim that everything that 
exists shares the same basic structure because everything that exists has its basis in the 
fundamental material reality of inconsistency and antagonism. But according to this 
understanding, every religious tradition and every society must, likewise, be structured 
antagonistically, must have its own points of internal conflict which can give rise to the 
dialectical transformation towards truth, and towards more radical politics. There are points 
in Žižek’s work where he partially acknowledges this possibility. In Less Than Nothing he 
argues that there is a fundamental antagonism in Buddhism between its Hīnayāna and 
Mahāyāna branches. Yet the Vajrayāna tradition which emerges as an attempt to reconcile 
this antagonism fails, on Žižek’s account, to be truly radical, regressing back towards 
paganism instead of moving forwards to something closer (it is implied) to the Christian 
notion of universality. But the antagonism remains nonetheless: surely there is nothing in 
Žižek’s materialism which rules out the possibility of the emergence of new forms of 
Buddhism which realise its radical potential? If Žižek is right about the nature of the material 
world — that everything is intrinsically historical because everything is inherently 
inconsistent — then he cannot be correct in his assertion that only the Christian and European 
traditions are properly historical. 
Second, Žižek consistently holds that a system can only be transformed by pushing it 
to confront its own internal antagonisms; yet he persistently argues that capitalism is no 
longer reliant on Europe, European values or Christianity (2001: 12; 2009b: 156). In order to 
overcome capitalism, Žižek says, we need a ‘gesture that would undermine capitalist 
globalization from the standpoint of universal Truth, just as Pauline Christianity did to the 
Roman global Empire’ (2000b: 2011). Yet it is not clear why this gesture must come from 
Christianity. If Christianity is no longer necessary to capitalism then, on Žižek’s logic, 
Christianity cannot provide the resources for capitalism’s overcoming. Žižek argues that the 
most effective resistance to violent European colonisation came not from ‘the reference to 
some kernel of previous ethnic identity’, as to make this kind of reference is to ‘automatically 
adopt the position of a victim resisting modernization’. Instead, those who most effectively 
resisted colonialism were those who were able to claim that their ‘resistance is grounded in 
the inherent dynamics of the imperialist system - that the imperialist system itself, through its 
inherent antagonism, activates the forces that will bring about its demise’ (2000b: 256). Why 
then does Žižek seek to resist the encroachment of this new capitalist globalisation by 
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reference to some kernel, some proper logic or core of European or Christian identity? 
Should he not instead ground his resistance to post-European, post-Christian capitalism in the 
inherent dynamics of this system? Does this system not have its own inherent antagonism 
which will, ultimately, activate the forces that brings about its demise?  
Third, while Žižek argues that it is only a system’s internal antagonisms which force 
it to transform itself, at the same time he repeatedly makes claims about the important role of 
encounters between ideas or societies with that which exists outside of themselves in 
understanding their history. Žižek argues that it is only by tearing a theory ‘out of its original 
context’ and ‘planting it in another historical moment’ that it can be first universalized and 
then ‘put to work, fulfilling its potential of political intervention’ (2001: 2-3). Nor, for Žižek, 
is it only ideas and theories which can be dramatically transformed by that which is outside of 
them: according to Žižek the rise of Islamic fundamentalism is not — as others have argued 
—  the consequence of the internal antagonisms within global capitalism, between, for 
example, Western governments and the Marxist government of Afghanistan (Delphy, 2015: 
187-224) or radical left anti-racist movements within the UK and USA (Kundnani, 2014). 
Instead, Žižek claims, it is the result of the separate histories of Western and ‘other societies - 
exemplarily the Muslim ones’, which mean that while, in Europe, modernization ‘was spread 
over centuries’ such that ‘we had the time to accommodate to this break, to soften its 
shattering impact’, ‘the symbolic universe’ of these other societies was ‘perturbed much more 
brutally’ (2008b: 33).6 States emerge, it seems, separately, and develop to some degree 
independently such that when they are brought back into contact with one another, this 
encounter can be profoundly traumatic (although Žižek rarely shows any interest in the 
dialectical development of non-European cultures). Perhaps we might add to this list of 
examples the fundamental role that the Western encounter with Islam played in the 
development not only of the idea that the European legacy is one which is fundamentally 
derived from ancient Greece, but also the emergence of the Protestantism which is, for Žižek, 
the highest dialectical development of Christianity. Žižek is right that the West cannot hold 
itself responsible for every evil of the world (2009a: 114); but nor then can it claim to be the 
sole hope of its salvation.  
                                                          
6  This argument not only erases the very long history of violent resistance to modernization 
within Europe (see, for example, Thompson, 1968); but also the physical violence which accompanied the 
symbolic violence of of European ‘modernization’ (e.g. Fanon, 2001); not to mention the continuities between 
both physical and symbolic violence within Europe and outside of it (e.g. Federici, 2004). 
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Conclusion: Towards a more Žižekian assessment of the Christian and European legacies 
Žižek’s argument for the centrality of the Christian-European legacy to the future of 
radical politics fails on its own terms, then. How might we move forward? I have two 
suggestions.  
First, because much of Žižek’s work focuses on moving individual Ones, be they 
subjects or societies, from desire - which through fantasy or ideology seeks to enlist others in 
the narcissistic project of bringing wholeness and harmony to the One – to drive – which 
liberates others to exist in their own right by assuming responsibility for the antagonisms 
internal to the One – there is relatively little in his work which explores the question of 
relationship with others outside of fantasy or ideology. Yet there are moments when this 
relationship can be glimpsed. For example, Žižek argues that the West was unable to 
understand the break-up of former Yugoslavia, because its idea of Yugoslavia was a fantasy, 
‘the place of savage ethnic conflicts long since overcome by civilised Europe’: by fantasising 
Yugoslavia in this way, Žižek argues, Europe was able to avoid confronting its own racism. 
Yet Yugoslavia did really exist in its own right. Far from a place in which ‘archaic ethnic 
passions’ were played out, as Europe imagined, it was a site for political conflict in which  
‘the moves of every political agent’ were ‘totally rational within the goals they want to attain’ 
(2005: 212-213). Here Žižek implies that the key to Europe’s engaging politically with the 
rest of the world world is to recognise that not everything can be understood through the lens 
of European narcissism. While the ‘gaze of the West’ is a powerful factor in global politics, it 
is not the only factor. Other states, other cultures, have their own agendas and desires. 
Perhaps if we are able to let go of the notion that everything centres around us — around 
Europe, around Christianity — we might finally be able to engage with others out of the kind 
of Christian love which, according to Žižek, entails ‘the hard and arduous work of repeated 
“uncoupling”’ in which we refuse to use others as the ‘blank screen’ onto which we project 
our own fantasies and begin to see them instead as they really are, in all their imperfections 
(2000a: 128).  
Second, Žižek is clear that the love which grounds radical politics entails commitment 
to particular things or ideas not because they are the only things worth committing to, not 
because they represent the kind of ‘all-encompassing unity’ which, for Žižek, can only ever 
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be the product of fantasy, but because they are the thing which, for better or worse, we cannot 
help but love. Žižek argues that: 
In the history of modern Europe, those who stood for the striving for universality were 
precisely atheist Jews: Spinoza, Marx, Freud. The irony is that in the history of anti-
Semitism Jews stand for both of these poles: sometimes they stand for the stubborn 
attachment to their particular life-form which prevents them from becoming full 
citizens of the state they live in, sometimes they stand for a ‘homeless’ and rootless 
universal cosmopolitanism indifferent to all particular ethnic forms … [perhaps this] is 
our central struggle today: the struggle between fidelity to the Messianic impulse and 
the reactive … ‘politics of fear’ which focuses on preserving one’s particular identity 
(2008b: 5).  
Yet elsewhere Žižek consistently argues that it is precisely particularity which makes 
universality possible. Would not the truly Žižekian argument be that it is precisely insofar as 
we retain a stubborn attachment to our particular life-form that we are able to represent 
universality? We might then argue that what we need is not only a radical re-imagining of the 
Christian and European legacy, but also radical re-imaginings of the North American, South 
American, African, Asian and Australasian legacies; of the Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim 
legacies; of every legacy there is, of every particularity there is, because, as Žižek himself 
argues, everything contains its own inherent antagonisms. As Wood (2015) points out, 
Žižek’s focus on Christian Europe blinds him to the radical political struggles taking place 
elsewhere in the world. Žižek’s understanding of the incarnation brings to mind Karl 
Rahner’s claim that, in the person Christ, the command to love God and love our neighbour 
become identical. But how can we love our neighbour if we cannot even see them? 
 
Marika Rose is Research Fellow in Digital Discipleship at the CODEC Research Centre, 
University of Durham. 
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